03/17/2015 5:20 PM
Senadores estadounidenses abogaron el martes a favor de sancionar a más funcionarios venezolanos involucrados en violaciones a los derechos humanos, argumentando que el régimen “dictatorial” que representan está involucrado en el narcotráfico y ha salido a reprimir salvajemente a la sociedad civil.
En una audiencia realizada en el Comité de Relaciones Exteriores del Senado, los legisladores advirtieron que la economía del país sudamericano está en vías de colapsar debido al manejo corrupto de su gobierno y que el régimen de Maduro en vez de aplicar correctivos está centrando sus esfuerzos en incrementar la represión contra toda forma de disidencia.
Pese a calificar las sanciones ya introducidas contra siete funcionarios del régimen como un “buen primer paso”, el senador demócrata por Nueva Jersey, Bob Menéndez, solicitó formalmente ante los representantes del Departamento de Estado presentes en la audiencia que la lista de sanciones sea ampliada.
“La ley de sanciones deja a muchos otros funcionarios venezolanos elegibles, dado su complicidad con las violaciones a los derechos humanos, ciertamente muchos más que los siete que han sido nombrados”, dijo Menéndez, quien conjuntamente con el senador republicano por Florida, Marco Rubio, jugó un papel protagónico en conseguir la aprobación de la legislación.
Read more here: http://www.elnuevoherald.com/noticias/mundo/america-latina/venezuela-es/article15105479.html#storylink=cpy
“Yo y otros integrantes solicitamos específicamente la inclusión del ministro de Defensa Vladimir Padrino López a la lista de sanciones, dado su papel en la autorización a hacer uso de fuerza letal contra ciudadanos desarmados”, manifestó.
El ministro de Defensa, visto como uno de los hombres de mayor confianza de Maduro dentro del sector militar, emitió recientemente una orden que permitía a funcionarios del orden público a utilizar armas de fuego contra manifestantes pacíficos.
A los pocos días de que esa orden fue emitida, un niño de 14 años fue asesinado por un agente del régimen, quien le disparó en la cabeza.
Los legisladores salieron en defensa de la aplicación de las sanciones, argumentando que no buscan castigar al pueblo, o incluso al gobierno venezolano, sino a aquellos funcionarios que violaron los derechos humanos durante las manifestaciones estudiantiles del año pasado, en una ola represiva que dejó más de 40 muertos y al menos 850 heridos.
La aplicación de la ley ha sido ampliamente criticada por el régimen, especialmente por la designación de Venezuela como una amenaza para la seguridad nacional de Estados Unidos.
Algunos críticos de la medida consideran que ese lenguaje es exagerado.
Pero Menéndez dijo durante la audiencia que ese no es el caso, dado a la activa participación de altos funcionarios del régimen bolivariano con las operaciones de narcotráfico.
“¿Dónde terminan las drogas? Terminan en nuestras ciudades, creando addicción en nuestra juventud. Eso en sí mismo es una amenaza para nuestra seguridad nacional”, enfatizó el senador.
Rubio, quien presidió la audiencia, advirtió que el régimen bolivariano no solo debe ser monitoreado por sus vínculos con el narcotráfico y las nuevas evidencias de que ha estado utilizando a la estatal Petróleos de Venezuela para lavar fondos ilícitos, sino también ante la inclinación de Maduro de utilizar la represión y la violencia para contener el creciente descontento.
El que Maduro se haya vuelto impopular se debe al gradual colapso que registra la economía venezolana, cuyas causas Rubio atribuyó directamente a las acciones del régimen bolivariano.
“Han sido la incompetencia de Nicolás Maduro y de su predecesor [Hugo] Chávez que han dejado a Venezuela en la situación en que se encuentra hoy en día”, dijo el senador republicano.
“Pero en vez de buscar soluciones a estos problemas la respuesta de Maduro ha sido la represión de la disidencia, desmantelar la democracia y, violentamente, violar los derechos humanos de su propio pueblo”, enfatizó.
El senador presentó una larga lista de los ilegales y arbitrarios pasos que el régimen ha tomado en los últimos meses para consolidar su poder, incluyendo la compra de medios de comunicación, y el encarcelamiento de dirigentes de la oposición, haciendo uso del sistema judicial como arma de persecución política.
Rubio también hizo mención de la destitución inconstitucional de la Asamblea Nacional de la diputada opositora María Corina Machado de mano del presidente de ese cuerpo legislativo, Diosdado Cabello, a quien calificó como “el hombre más corrupto de Venezuela, y eso es mucho decir”.
Por su parte, los representantes del Departamento de Estado presentes en la audiencia dijeron que la administración de Barack Obama está monitoreando cuidadosamente los acontecimientos en Venezuela y dijeron que el presidente dará al tema venezolano prioridad cuando se reúna con sus homólogos latinoamericanos en la Cumbre de las Américas.
El Departamento de Estado le está prestando especial atención a los preparativos de las elecciones parlamentarias previstas para la segunda mitad del año en Venezuela y desea solicitarles a los países de la región que participen en un proceso de monitoreo que se ajuste a las normas internacionales.
“Las elecciones de la Asamblea Nacional de este año -explicó- representan una oportunidad para los venezolanos de participar en un discurso legítimo y democrático”, dijo Alex Lee, subsecretario adjunto para América Latina del Departamento de Estado.
“Unos resultados creíbles de las elecciones podrían reducir las tensiones en Venezuela. Hemos instado a los socios regionales a alentar a Venezuela a aceptar una misión de observación electoral internacional sólida”, señaló.
Siga a Antonio María Delgado en Twitter:@DelgadoAntonioM
Testimonio de Edward A. Lee, dado hoy en la audiencia del senado de EEUU sobre Vzla ● http://goo.gl/BCmbg3
“DEEPENJNG POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CRlSIS IN VENEZUELA: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS AND TilE WESTERN HEMISPHERE”
TESTIMONY OF EDWARD ALEXANDER LEE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BEFORE TilE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS CO¥MI’fTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE, TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, CIVILIAN SECURiTY, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RlGIITS AND GLOBAL UNITED WOMEN’S ISSUES STATES SENATE MARCH 17,2015
Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer, Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to speak with you about Venezuela. I appreciate your interest in Venezuela and your support for U.S. assistance and our policies there.
We are deeply concerned about the situation in Venezuela where last year legitimate political, economic, and social grievances and a lack of adequate democratic space brought protests and, unfortunately, violence. Tensions within Venezuela continue to build and the government has intensified its actions to repress dissent. The United States has called on the Venezuelan government to respect human rights, uphold the rule of law, and engage in a peaceful, inclusive dialogue with Venezuelans across the political spectrum to alleviate the current tension. We have called on the Venezuelan government to release Mayor Antonio Ledezma, opposition leader Leopolda Lopez, Mayor Daniel Ceballos, and others it has unjustly jailed, including dozens of students. We have encouraged the . government to improve the climate of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including respect for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association. I know this committee shares our concerns, and we welcome your strong support for democracy in Venezuela.
Venezuela’s problems cannot be solved by criminalizing legitimate, democratic dissent. These actions appear to be a clear attempt by the Venezuelan government to divert attention from that country’s economic and political problems. Rather than imprisoning and intimidating its critics, we believe the Venezuelan government should focus on finding real solutions through democratic 03/16/2015 6:15PM (GMT-04:00) 03/16/2015 19:13 FAX 2026479667 DOS leglslatiYe Affairs !g]0003/0004 dialogue. As I have mentioned, we will not refrnin from speaking out about human rights abuses. We are joined in this by dozens of individuals and entities, including the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, Organization of American States (OAS) Secretary General Insulza, the Peruvian, Costa Rican, and Colombian governments, and the Inter American Commission on Human Rights, among others. ·
Advancing human rights and democratic processes are a key U.S. foreign policy objective. The President’s March 9 Executive Order “Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela,” which implements the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of2014, is a manifestation of our commitment to advancing respect for human rights, safeguarding democratic institutions, and protecting the U.S. fmancial system from the illicit financial flows from public conuption in Venezuela.
Executive Order 13692 is aimed at persons involved in or responsible for certain conduct in Venezuela, including actions that undermine democratic processes or institutions, the use of violence or conduct that constitutes human rights violations and abuses, including in response to anti-government protests, actions that prohibit, limit, or penalize the exercise of freedom of expression or ‘peaceful assembly, as well as public conuption by senior government officials in Venezuela The Executive Order does not target the people or the economy of Venezuela.
I want to be clear: it is not our policy or intent to promote instability in Venezuela or to endorse solutions to Venezuela’s political problems that are inconsistent with its own legal system. The United States is not seeking the downfall of the Venezuelan govenunent nor trying to sabotage the Venezuelan economy. We remain Venezuela’s largest trading partner. President Maduro publicly expresses a desire to improve our bilateral relationship, and we are open to direct communication with the Venezuelan government. We maintain diplomatic relations and welcome conversations and debate. We remain committed to maintaining our strong and lasting ties with the people ofVenezuela. We will not, however, refrain from calling out human rights abuses and other actions and policies that undermine democracy.
We hope the Venezuelan government will focus its energy on fmding real solutions for the country’s mounting economic and political problems through democratic dialogue with the political opposition, civil society, and the private sector. This year’s National Assembly elections present an opportunity for Venezuelans to engage in legitimate, democratic discourse. And, credible election results could reduce tensions in Venezuela. We have urged regional partners to encourage Venezuela to accept a robust international electoral observation mission, using accepted international standards, for those elections. Now is the time for the region to work together to help Venezuela to work toward a democratic solution to the challenges the country faces.
We will also continue to work closely with Congress and others in the region to support greater political expression in Venezuela, and to encourage the Venezuelan government to live up to its required commitments to democracy and human rights, as articulated in the OAS Charter, the Inter American Democratic Charter, and other relevant instruments.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to end by saying that we sincerely appreciate the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s contributions to the promotion of human rights in Venezuela. The strong, bipartisan cooperation among this Committee’s Members and staff to support the State Department’s championing of democracy, human rights and freedom of expression throughout the hemisphere is a credit to our great country.
Thank you and I look forward to answering your questions.
Testimonio de John Smith, dado hoy en la audiencia del senado de EEUU sobre Vzla ● http://goo.gl/0W0o9k
Written Testimony of the Acting Director of the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, John E. Smith, Before the Western Hemisphere Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
March 17, 2015
Venezuela Sanctions Program
Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to appear before you today at this important hearing on political and economic developments in Venezuela, the human rights situation in the country, and the implications of these topics for regional stability and U.S. interests. As the Acting Director of the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), I will address the Administration’s implementation of the sanctions measures in the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 (the Act), which was signed into law on December 18, 2014.
Executive Order 13692
On March 9, the President issued Executive Order 13692 declaring a national emergency with respect to the situation in Venezuela, which is a prerequisite for the imposition of economic sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The Executive Order, which implements the targeted sanctions contained in the Act and builds on them in key respects, imposes economic sanctions on persons listed in an Annex to the Order and any persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to have engaged in or to have been responsible for certain enumerated activities in relation to Venezuela such as undermining democratic processes or institutions, committing serious abuses or violations of human rights, limiting or penalizing the exercise of freedom of expression or peaceful assembly, or being involved in public corruption by senior Venezuelan government 2 officials. The Executive Order also contains a “status-based” authority targeting current and former officials of the Government of Venezuela, which gives the Secretary of the Treasury additional flexibility to go after targets of concern for which there may be limitations on our ability to designate under the other “conduct-based” authorities. The President named seven Venezuelan individuals in the Annex to the Order. The property and interests in property of these individuals are blocked, meaning their assets within U.S. jurisdiction are frozen, and U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in any transactions or dealings with them. The Executive Order also suspends the entry into the United States of individuals who are determined to meet the criteria for economic sanctions.
Last week’s action imposing sanctions on seven individuals focused on those involved in human rights abuses and the persecution of political opponents connected to the events surrounding the February 2014 protests highlighted in the Act. Most of the individuals targeted are currently or were formerly associated with Venezuela’s national guard, the armed forces, the intelligence service, or the national police, members of which played key roles in repression against individuals involved in the protests beginning in February 2014. The Executive Order also targeted a national level prosecutor who has charged – based in part on implausible and/or fabricated information – several opposition members with conspiring to assassinate or overthrow President Maduro. Mr. Chairman, I want to acknowledge the leadership you have demonstrated on this issue, and I would note that six of the seven targets in the Annex to the Executive Order were included in your list of individuals published in May of last year.
In addition to implementing the Act, the Order expands the designation criteria beyond the requirements of the Act. This will allow for greater targeting flexibility and the highlighting, targeting, and deterrence of additional problematic behavior that is ongoing in Venezuela. We remain committed to defending human rights, advancing democratic governance in Venezuela, and protecting the U.S. financial system from abuse.
Building on the Legislation
While the Act focuses on human rights abuses specifically related to last year’s protests, the Executive Order expands our targeting authority to more broadly cover any significant acts of violence or serious violations of human rights in relation to Venezuela, and restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression or peaceful assembly in Venezuela, allowing us to deter and address repression as it may arise. The Order also includes designation criteria related to the undermining of democracy in Venezuela and to public corruption by senior Venezuelan government officials. Finally, the E.O. gives us the discretionary authority to designate current or former Venezuelan government officials. As we have learned from experience across a number of sanctions programs, this type of “status-based” authority is a useful tool that allows us to go after targets of concern for which there may be limitations to our ability to designate under “conduct-based” authorities.
To be clear, these sanctions are not aimed against the country of Venezuela. They do not target the Venezuelan people or the economy, nor do they sanction the Venezuelan government as a whole. To the contrary, this remains a targeted sanctions program focused tightly and precisely on bad actors undermining Venezuela’s democracy, violating and abusing the human rights of its 4 citizens, and diverting much-needed economic resources for personal gain – resources that could and should be invested for the public good
Public Corruption
Turning specifically to this sanctions program’s focus on public corruption in Venezuela, I would echo President Obama, who has said that fighting corruption is one of the great struggles of our time. Corruption, beyond its unethical nature, siphons off important resources that could be used to feed children or build schools and infrastructure that promote development.
As the largest economy in the world, we remain Venezuela’s primary trading partner and maintain financial ties to Venezuela. These relationships, while a natural outcome of our longstanding economic engagement with the region, also potentially expose our financial system to illicit financial flows from public corruption in Venezuela, as Venezuelan government officials who control access to scarce U.S. dollars attempt to take advantage to reap illicit gains. This close interaction with the U.S. financial system, however, also gives us leverage from a sanctions perspective. Venezuela’s heavy use of the U.S. dollar and Venezuelans’ frequent travel to the United States make targets of our sanctions vulnerable. We expect our designations will have bite.
In addition, Treasury is using the full range of its financial tools to address the exploitation of the U.S. financial system in furtherance of corruption schemes. Last week, for example, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the Department of the Treasury issued a public notice of finding that Banca Privada d’Andorra (BPA) is a financial institution operating 5 outside of the United States that is of a “primary money laundering concern.” The finding that accompanied this notice outlined how a third-party money launderer in Venezuela worked with BPA to deposit the proceeds of public corruption, some of which transited the U.S. financial system, into an account at BPA. This network was well connected to Venezuelan government officials and facilitated the movement of at least $50 million through the United States from 2011 to 2013 in support of this money laundering network.
Narcotics, Terrorism, and Iran
It is also worth noting the long history of the application of U.S. sanctions to foreign policy and national security concerns with a Venezuela nexus. Even before the past year’s events, we have not hesitated to designate Venezuelan banks and other companies for their connections with Iranian entities sanctioned for nuclear proliferation activities pursuant to our counterproliferation authorities. These actions included the designation of the International Development Bank in Caracas, a subsidiary of the Tehran-based Export Development Bank of Iran.
Our actions to combat narcotics trafficking in Latin America pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act have proceeded to a steady drumbeat, and they have not overlooked Venezuelan targets. For example, in September 2011, OFAC designated four Venezuelan government officials for acting for or on behalf of the FARC, a designated narco-terrorist organization. The four officials acted in direct support of the FARC’s narcotics and arms trafficking activities in Venezuela. In September 2012, shortly after his arrest in Panama, OFAC designated a Venezuelan narcotics trafficker and his company. The trafficker was previously 6 indicted in the Southern District of Florida on cocaine trafficking charges. And in August 2013, OFAC designated a former Venezuelan National Guard captain as a significant foreign narcotics trafficker. The captain had previously been indicted in the Eastern District of New York in March 2011 on multiple cocaine trafficking charges. He facilitated cocaine loads from Colombia through Venezuela in partnership with well-known narcotics traffickers in Colombia and Mexico.
We have also acted to constrain Lebanese Hizballah activity in Venezuela, designating in 2008 Hizballah supporters and fundraisers active in Venezuela pursuant to our counter-terrorism sanctions authorities. One of the targets was a senior Venezuelan diplomat who had facilitated the travel of Hizballah members to and from Venezuela.
Conclusion
Before I conclude these remarks, I want to emphasize that we retain the ability to respond to events in Venezuela as they unfold. We stand ready with a powerful financial tool to deter abuses and target those who may choose to undermine democratic processes or institutions. In concert with this Congress, we have made clear that the United States will not stand idly by and witness the repression that has occurred in Venezuela this past year. We have demonstrated in numerous and diverse scenarios across the globe that the United States has the ability to target those involved in human rights abuses and the undermining of democracy and to prevent them from accessing the United States financial system. And when we do so, they will find themselves isolated domestically, regionally, and globally. Thank you.
Testimonio de Santiago Canton, dado hoy en la audiencia del senado de EEUU sobre Vzla ● http://goo.gl/0W0o9k
Written Testimony of the Acting Director of the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, John E. Smith, Before the Western Hemisphere Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
March 17, 2015
Venezuela Sanctions Program
Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to appear before you today at this important hearing on political and economic developments in Venezuela, the human rights situation in the country, and the implications of these topics for regional stability and U.S. interests. As the Acting Director of the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), I will address the Administration’s implementation of the sanctions measures in the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 (the Act), which was signed into law on December 18, 2014.
Executive Order 13692
On March 9, the President issued Executive Order 13692 declaring a national emergency with respect to the situation in Venezuela, which is a prerequisite for the imposition of economic sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The Executive Order, which implements the targeted sanctions contained in the Act and builds on them in key respects, imposes economic sanctions on persons listed in an Annex to the Order and any persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to have engaged in or to have been responsible for certain enumerated activities in relation to Venezuela such as undermining democratic processes or institutions, committing serious abuses or violations of human rights, limiting or penalizing the exercise of freedom of expression or peaceful assembly, or being involved in public corruption by senior Venezuelan government 2 officials. The Executive Order also contains a “status-based” authority targeting current and former officials of the Government of Venezuela, which gives the Secretary of the Treasury additional flexibility to go after targets of concern for which there may be limitations on our ability to designate under the other “conduct-based” authorities. The President named seven Venezuelan individuals in the Annex to the Order. The property and interests in property of these individuals are blocked, meaning their assets within U.S. jurisdiction are frozen, and U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in any transactions or dealings with them. The Executive Order also suspends the entry into the United States of individuals who are determined to meet the criteria for economic sanctions
Last week’s action imposing sanctions on seven individuals focused on those involved in human rights abuses and the persecution of political opponents connected to the events surrounding the February 2014 protests highlighted in the Act. Most of the individuals targeted are currently or were formerly associated with Venezuela’s national guard, the armed forces, the intelligence service, or the national police, members of which played key roles in repression against individuals involved in the protests beginning in February 2014. The Executive Order also targeted a national level prosecutor who has charged – based in part on implausible and/or fabricated information – several opposition members with conspiring to assassinate or overthrow President Maduro. Mr. Chairman, I want to acknowledge the leadership you have demonstrated on this issue, and I would note that six of the seven targets in the Annex to the Executive Order were included in your list of individuals published in May of last year.
In addition to implementing the Act, the Order expands the designation criteria beyond the requirements of the Act. This will allow for greater targeting flexibility and the highlighting, targeting, and deterrence of additional problematic behavior that is ongoing in Venezuela. We remain committed to defending human rights, advancing democratic governance in Venezuela, and protecting the U.S. financial system from abuse.
Building on the Legislation
While the Act focuses on human rights abuses specifically related to last year’s protests, the Executive Order expands our targeting authority to more broadly cover any significant acts of violence or serious violations of human rights in relation to Venezuela, and restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression or peaceful assembly in Venezuela, allowing us to deter and address repression as it may arise. The Order also includes designation criteria related to the undermining of democracy in Venezuela and to public corruption by senior Venezuelan government officials. Finally, the E.O. gives us the discretionary authority to designate current or former Venezuelan government officials. As we have learned from experience across a number of sanctions programs, this type of “status-based” authority is a useful tool that allows us to go after targets of concern for which there may be limitations to our ability to designate under “conduct-based” authorities.
To be clear, these sanctions are not aimed against the country of Venezuela. They do not target the Venezuelan people or the economy, nor do they sanction the Venezuelan government as a whole. To the contrary, this remains a targeted sanctions program focused tightly and precisely on bad actors undermining Venezuela’s democracy, violating and abusing the human rights of its 4 citizens, and diverting much-needed economic resources for personal gain – resources that could and should be invested for the public good.
Public Corruption
Turning specifically to this sanctions program’s focus on public corruption in Venezuela, I would echo President Obama, who has said that fighting corruption is one of the great struggles of our time. Corruption, beyond its unethical nature, siphons off important resources that could be used to feed children or build schools and infrastructure that promote development.
As the largest economy in the world, we remain Venezuela’s primary trading partner and maintain financial ties to Venezuela. These relationships, while a natural outcome of our longstanding economic engagement with the region, also potentially expose our financial system to illicit financial flows from public corruption in Venezuela, as Venezuelan government officials who control access to scarce U.S. dollars attempt to take advantage to reap illicit gains. This close interaction with the U.S. financial system, however, also gives us leverage from a sanctions perspective. Venezuela’s heavy use of the U.S. dollar and Venezuelans’ frequent travel to the United States make targets of our sanctions vulnerable. We expect our designations will have bite.
In addition, Treasury is using the full range of its financial tools to address the exploitation of the U.S. financial system in furtherance of corruption schemes. Last week, for example, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the Department of the Treasury issued a public notice of finding that Banca Privada d’Andorra (BPA) is a financial institution operating 5 outside of the United States that is of a “primary money laundering concern.” The finding that accompanied this notice outlined how a third-party money launderer in Venezuela worked with BPA to deposit the proceeds of public corruption, some of which transited the U.S. financial system, into an account at BPA. This network was well connected to Venezuelan government officials and facilitated the movement of at least $50 million through the United States from 2011 to 2013 in support of this money laundering network.
Narcotics, Terrorism, and Iran
It is also worth noting the long history of the application of U.S. sanctions to foreign policy and national security concerns with a Venezuela nexus. Even before the past year’s events, we have not hesitated to designate Venezuelan banks and other companies for their connections with Iranian entities sanctioned for nuclear proliferation activities pursuant to our counterproliferation authorities. These actions included the designation of the International Development Bank in Caracas, a subsidiary of the Tehran-based Export Development Bank of Iran
Our actions to combat narcotics trafficking in Latin America pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act have proceeded to a steady drumbeat, and they have not overlooked Venezuelan targets. For example, in September 2011, OFAC designated four Venezuelan government officials for acting for or on behalf of the FARC, a designated narco-terrorist organization. The four officials acted in direct support of the FARC’s narcotics and arms trafficking activities in Venezuela. In September 2012, shortly after his arrest in Panama, OFAC designated a Venezuelan narcotics trafficker and his company. The trafficker was previously 6 indicted in the Southern District of Florida on cocaine trafficking charges. And in August 2013, OFAC designated a former Venezuelan National Guard captain as a significant foreign narcotics trafficker. The captain had previously been indicted in the Eastern District of New York in March 2011 on multiple cocaine trafficking charges. He facilitated cocaine loads from Colombia through Venezuela in partnership with well-known narcotics traffickers in Colombia and Mexico.
We have also acted to constrain Lebanese Hizballah activity in Venezuela, designating in 2008 Hizballah supporters and fundraisers active in Venezuela pursuant to our counter-terrorism sanctions authorities. One of the targets was a senior Venezuelan diplomat who had facilitated the travel of Hizballah members to and from Venezuela.
Conclusion Before I conclude these remarks, I want to emphasize that we retain the ability to respond to events in Venezuela as they unfold. We stand ready with a powerful financial tool to deter abuses and target those who may choose to undermine democratic processes or institutions. In concert with this Congress, we have made clear that the United States will not stand idly by and witness the repression that has occurred in Venezuela this past year. We have demonstrated in numerous and diverse scenarios across the globe that the United States has the ability to target those involved in human rights abuses and the undermining of democracy and to prevent them from accessing the United States financial system. And when we do so, they will find themselves isolated domestically, regionally, and globally. Thank you.
Testimonio de Douglas Farah, dado hoy en la audiencia del senado de EEUU sobre Vzla ● http://goo.gl/f1bvsJ
Testimony of Douglas Farah
President, IBI Consultants LLC Senior Non-Resident Associate, Americas Program, CSIS Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee the Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women’s Issues
“Deepening Political and Economic Crisis in Venezuela: Implications for U.S. Interests and the Western Hemisphere”
March 17, 2015
SD-419
Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for the invitation today to discuss the ongoing and accelerating crisis in Venezuela and its implications for the United States and regional security issues. I speak on behalf of only IBI Consultants and myself. The views are mine and do not necessarily reflect those of CSIS or IASC
There is little doubt that Venezuela has for a decade now posed a significant threat not only to U.S. security interests in the Western Hemisphere, but to the survival of democracy and the rule of law in the region. A recent investigation by Veja, a respected Brazilian magazine, shows that Venezuela, with the help of Argentina, actively tried to help Iran’s nuclear program in violation of international sanctions.1 More than a dozen senior Venezuelan officials have been publicly identified by U.S. officials as being directly involved in supporting and participating in drug trafficking and support of designated terrorist groups.
The threat originating in Venezuela is not confined to Venezuela. The late Hugo Chávez, acting in concert with his allies Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina, set out to redefine the political landscape in Latin America. And to a large degree they have been successful. Unfortunately the changes wrought under the banner of “Socialism for the 21st Century” have brought massive corruption; rising violence; a disdain for the rule of law; the rise of equating an individual leader as the state (“Chávez is Venezuela”); a significant and ongoing, concerted effort to silence peaceful opposition and independent media; and collapse of institutions designed to guarantee oversight and transparency of public individuals and entities.
My testimony will focus on this alliance, of which Venezuela is the indisputable leader and primary axis around which the others revolve. However, and this what presents the greater strategic threat emanating from Venezuela, it is not acting alone, but in concert with multiple other nations.
Venezuela and its allies have moved perilously close to being “criminalized states,” that is, states where the senior leadership is aware of and involved and act on behalf of the state, with transnational organized crime (TOC), where TOC is used as an instrument of statecraft, and where levers of state power are incorporated into the operational structure of one or more TOC groups.2 The Maduro administration is the central component to a multi-state ongoing criminal enterprise, carried out in concert with Iran and a growing Russian presence, whose primary strategic objective is to cling to power by whatever means necessary and harm the United States and its allies.
Leonardo Courinho, “Chavistas confirmam conspiracao denuciada por Nisman,” Veja, March 14, 2015, accessed at: http://veja.abril.com.br/noticia/mundo/chavistas-confirmam-conspiracaodenunciada-por-nisman 2 This definition is drawn from my study of transnational organized crime in Latin America. For a full discussion see: Douglas Farah, Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Criminalized States in Latin America: An Emerging Tier-One National Security Priority (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 2012), accessed at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1117.
Democracy was far from perfect before the advent of the “Bolivarian Revolution,” as Chávez defined his movement. Many of the region’s countries were emerging from years of brutal and repressive military dictatorship, many of them backed by the United States. The new electoral systems were often rigid, exclusive and corrupt. However, rather than bringing about necessary reforms, Chávez created a system that has completely corrupted the electoral system, institutionalized massive corruption, criminalized non-violent dissent, and made common cause with transnational terrorist and drug trafficking organizations. Beginning with the Chávez government and continuing into the Maduro administration Venezuela has actively pursued an official military doctrine that embraces the use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States. 3
The stakes in the unfolding crisis in Venezuela for U.S. interests and the survival of democracy in Latin America are high. The consequences of the growth of the poisonous Bolivarian criminal enterprise are lethal.
Few understood this better than Alberto Nisman, the courageous Argentine prosecutor who was investigating the 1994 Iran-backed bombing of the AMIA Jewish center in Buenos Aires. Before being murdered on January 18 Nisman had documented the Bolivarian-Iran actions across the Western Hemisphere, including two attempted attacks backed by Iran in the United States. The week before his death, Nisman had formally accused Argentine President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and senior members of her inner circle of illegally seeking to cut to hide Iran’s role in the AMIA case in exchange for oil to relieve Argentina’s chronic fuel shortages. The warming relationship between Iran and Argentina was directly brokered by Venezuelan leaders. Whether or not the Argentine or Iranian government had direct roles in the unsolved murder of Nisman, the three nations together clearly created a climate in which he could be killed with impunity.4
As the Veja investigation shows, Venezuela was a key player in the efforts of Iran to reestablish nuclear ties to Argentina, and that such a relationship was of primary interest to
3 The primary text outlining this philosophy, from which Chávez adopted his military doctrine is Peripheral Warfare and Revolutionary Islam: Origins, Rules and Ethics of Asymmetrical Warfare (Guerra Periférica y el Islam Revolucionario: Orígenes, Reglas y Ética de la Guerra Asimétrica ) by the Spanish politician and ideologue Jorge Verstrynge. The tract is a continuation of and exploration of convicted terrorist Ilich Sánchez Ramirez’s thoughts, incorporating an explicit endorsement of the use of weapons of mass destruction to destroy the United States. Verstrynge argues for the destruction of United States through series of asymmetrical attacks like those of 9-11, in the belief that the United States will simply crumble when its vast military strength cannot be used to combat its enemies. Although he is not a Muslim, and the book was not written directly in relation to the Venezuelan experience, Verstrynge moves beyond Sánchez Ramirez to embrace all strands of radical Islam for helping to expand the parameters of what irregular warfare should encompass, including the use of biological and nuclear weapons, along with the correlated civilian casualties among the enemy. 4 For a fuller discussion of the Nisman murder see: Douglas Farah, “The Murder of Alberto Nisman: How the Government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner created the environment for a perfect crime,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, March 2015. For a fuller discussion of the triangulation efforts of Iran, Venezuela and Argentina in the nuclear program, see: Courihno, op cit.; Douglas Farah, “Back to the Future: Argentina Unravels,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, February 2013, accessed at: http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20130227_BacktotheFuture.pdf
the Iranians.5 Because of the high value Iran placed on the acquisition of nuclear technology, Chávez promised to personally request Argentina’s help, and to do so immediately.6
In addition nuclear overtures, Venezuela and Argentina have developed an elaborate and opaque mechanism for transferring millions of dollars in funds between the two nations with no oversight or accountability. One of the primary mechanisms was a program called “200 Socialist Factories,” (200 Fábricas Socialistas). Venezuelan government documents show that this program, although producing few functioning factories and even fewer economic benefits, allowed for direct Iranian participation in the ventures, most likely as a way of moving money that otherwise would be frozen under international financial sanctions.7
Of concern to the United States should be the stated policy of the Bolivarian bloc of nations to break the traditional ties of the region to the United States. To this end, the Bolivarian alliance has formed numerous organizations and military alliances – including a military academy in Bolivia to erase the vestiges of U.S. military training — which explicitly exclude the United States.8
U.S. influence is being replaced by a lethal doctrine of asymmetrical warfare, inspired by authoritarian governments seeking perpetual power and nurtured by Iran. Through an interlocking and rapidly expanding network of official websites, publishing houses, think tanks and military academies, the governments of Venezuela, Argentina and Cuba have created a dominant narrative that identifies the United States as the primary threat to Latin America.
A constant in the narrative, and a particular favorite of the late Chávez, is that a U.S. invasion is imminent and unavoidable. This is because the alleged United States policy is based on pillaging the region’s natural resources, toppling the revolutionary regimes leading the march to Latin American independence, and subjugating its citizens. This preposterous narrative is often used by Maduro to justify the repressive and illegal arrest of opposition leaders who are held for months and years without trial or charges, as alleged accomplices in the fabricated crimes.
This narrative has long been a part of the Latin American landscape, shaped by mass movements, armed insurgencies and Marxist ideologies, and based on the turbulent history of relations between the United States and the region. What is different now is the overt
5 It is important to remember that throughout the 1970s until 1993 Argentina had a robust nuclear relationship with Iran, and the current Iranian reactors were retrofitted and upgraded with Argentine nuclear technology. Nisman, in his indictment of Iranian leaders for planning the AMIA bombing, stated that a major trigger for Iran’s decision to blow up the AMIA building was the decision by Argentina, under pressure from the U.S. and Europe, to pause its nuclear cooperation with Iran. In addition to the Veja article, see: Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, “Iran Looks to Argentina for nuclear fuel,” Asia Times, November 6, 2009, accessed at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KK06Ak02.html
6 Courinho, op. cit.
7 Documents in possession of the author
8 These include recently founded Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños-CELAC), and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América-ALBA).
multi-government sponsorship of the effort and the official adoption of these positions as policy and doctrine. This gives the current campaign deeper roots and access to levers of state power.
As discussed at length below, Iran, identified by successive U.S. administrations as a state sponsor of terrorism, has expanded its political alliances, diplomatic presence, trade initiatives, and military and intelligence programs in the Bolivarian axis, primarily through the deep ties with Venezuela.
In 2012 the United States intelligence community assessed that Iranian leadership was more willing to launch a terrorist attack inside the Homeland in response to perceived threats from the United States.9
In 2013 the Argentine prosecutor Nisman released a report documenting through littlestudied reports, informants, and the Iranian media, how official Iran state policy embraced assassination and terror, something which it never tried to hide and has never recanted, and the role of Venezuela in Iran’s strategy
Many of the assumptions undergirding Prosecutor Nisman’s work were drawn directly from the Iranian constitution, an extraordinary document in which Iran stakes its claim to world domination in the name of Allah. It is worth a somewhat extended review here, given the repeated statements of solidary with Iran and its revolution by Venezuelan leaders. The preamble to the Iranian constitution states:
With due consideration for the Islamic Element of the Iranian Revolution, which has been a movement for the victory of all oppressed peoples who are confronted with aggressors, the constitution shall pave the way for perpetuation of this revolution within and outside the country, particularly in terms of the expansion of international relationships with other Islamic and popular movements. The Constitution seeks to lay the groundwork for the creation of a single world nation…and perpetuate the struggle to make this nation a reality for all the world’s needy and oppressed nations
It goes on to say that:
In establishing and equipping the country’s defense forces, we will allow for the fact that faith and ideology constitute the foundation and the criterion we must adhere to. Therefore, the army of the Islamic Republic of Iran and troops of the Revolutionary Guard will be created in accordance with the objective mentioned above, and will be entrusted with the task not only of protecting and preserving our borders, but also an ideological mission, that is to say, Jihad in the name of Allah and the world.10
9 James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence,
“U10 Translation of the Iranian Constitution of 1979 provided by the University of Nevada Las Vegas, accessed at: https://faculty.unlv.edu/pwerth/Const-Iran%28abridge%29.pdfnclassified Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 31, 2012, p. 6
Shortly after Nisman’s 2013 report the U.S. Department of State issued a Congressionally – mandated report on Iran’s activities in Latin America which completely ignored Nisman’s fieldwork, as well as dissenting views within the U.S. government – most notably U.S. Southern Command, which has military responsibility for the region. Instead the State Department concluded that, while Iran’s interest in Latin America “is of concern,” Iranian “influence in Latin America and the Caribbean is waning.”11 In September 2014 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a sharp critique of the State Department effort, noting the report only fully addressed two of the 12 issues raised, while partially addressing six issues, and leaving four completely unaddressed.12
In addition to serving as a gateway for Iran’s presence in the region, Venezuela has also been the primary conduit for Russia’s growing presence in the region, something of growing concern
Riding on the wave of radical anti-U.S. populism sponsored by Venezuela, Russia is now firmly allied with the ranks of Latin America’s populist, authoritarian and virulently antiAmerican leaders of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América – ALBA). The Putin government is providing ALBA nations with weapons, police and military training and equipment, nuclear technology, oil exploration equipment, financial assistance, and an influential friend on the United Nations Security Council and other international forums.
In return, these allies are shielding Russia from international isolation, providing political and diplomatic support, and an important regional media network – both traditional and social – that offers unstinting support for Putin while casting the United States as the global aggressor. At the same time, ALBA countries are increasing Russia’s access to the hemisphere’s ports and airspace, and ultimately, increasing Russia’s sphere of influence in a region where the United States has seldom been so challenged.13
Gen. John Kelly, the commander of the U.S. Southern Command, in his 2015 testimony before Congress, noted Russia’s growing activities in Latin America were part of a global strategy of using “power projection in an attempt to erode U.S. leadership and challenge U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere…Russia has courted Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua to gain access to air bases and ports of supply for Russian naval assets and strategic bombers operating in the Western Hemisphere.”14
Where the Russian state establishes a presence, Russian organized crime invariably follows. The immediate consequence is the rapid increase in cocaine flows from Latin America to Russia, and the former Soviet Union, with almost all of the cocaine originating from countries that Russia vehemently supports – Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Bolivia.15
The FARC,16 the hemisphere’s oldest and largest insurgency and designated drug trafficking and terrorist organization by both the United States and European Union17, remains at the center of a multitude of criminal enterprises and terrorist activities that stretch from Colombia south to Argentina, and northward to Central America and into direct ties to the Mexican drug cartels, primarily the Sinaloa organization. Despite ongoing peace talks with the government over the past two years, the insurgency remains involved in the massive laundering of drug money, and recent cases by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) have shown the direct and growing criminal drug ties of the FARC and Hezbollah.
Following the model pioneered by Iran and Hezbollah, senior Venezuelan military and political leaders have allowed the FARC to traffic cocaine through Venezuela to West Africa, sharing in the profits. Almost every major shipment of cocaine to West Africa that U.S. law enforcement officials have been able to trace back have originated from or passed through Venezuelan territory.18
Under the protection of the governments of Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Bolivia – as well as powerful friends in El Salvador and Panama — the FARC maintains a robust international infrastructure that is producing and moving thousands of kilos of cocaine and laundering hundreds of millions of dollars. It has emerged as a pioneer hybrid criminalterrorist insurgency, using drug money to sustain an ideological movement. Over time the ideology has faded and the FARC has become much more of a business enterprise, helping to enrich its leadership and the leadership of the regional governments it supports.
As one study of internal FARC documents, noted
When Chávez became president of Venezuela in February 1999, FARC had not only enjoyed a relationship with him for at least some of the previous seven years but had also penetrated and learned how to best use Venezuelan territory and politics, manipulating and building alliances with new and traditional Venezuelan political sectors, traversing the Colombia-Venezuela border in areas ranging from coastal desert to Amazonian jungle and building cooperative relationships with the Venezuelan armed forces. Once Chávez was inaugurated, Venezuelan border security and foreign policies shifted in the FARC’s favor.19
In this context there is also growing evidence that the Venezuela government under Chávez and Maduro is actively promoting drug trafficking and TOC/terrorist groups, particularly the FARC and Hezbollah.20 Perhaps the strongest public evidence of the importance of Venezuela to the FARC is the public designation of three of senior government officials by the U.S Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
OFAC said the three–Hugo Armando Carvajál, director of Venezuelan Military Intelligence; Henry de Jesus Rangél, director of the Venezuelan Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services; and Ramón Emilio Rodriguez Chacín, former minister of justice and former minister of interior — were responsible for “materially supporting the FARC, a narco-terrorist organization.” It specifically accused Carvajál and Rangel of protecting FARC cocaine shipments moving through Venezuela, and said Rodriguez Chacín, who resigned his government position just a few days before the designations, was the “Venezuelan government’s main weapons contact for the FARC.”21
In November 2010, Rangel was promoted to the overall commander of the Venezuelan armed forces22 and in January 2012 was named defense minister as part of Chávez’s promotion of close associates tied to drug trafficking and the FARC.23 In July 2014 Carvajal was detained in Aruba because of a U.S. indictment against him for drug trafficking in support of the FARC. Aruban authorities released him before he could be extradited. He received as a conquering hero when he returned to Venezuela.24
19 “The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archives of ‘Raúl Reyes,’” International Institute for Strategic Studies,” May 2011.
20 The strongest documentary evidence of Chavéz’s support for the FARC comes from the Reyes documents, which contained the internal communications of senior FARC commanders with senior Venezuelan officials, discussing everything from security arrangements in hostage exchanges to the possibility of joint training exercises and the purchasing of weapons. For full details of these documents and their interpretation, see: “The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archives of ‘Raúl Reyes,’” op cit.
21 “Treasury Targets Venezuelan Government Officials Support of the FARC,” U.S. Treasury Department Office of Public Affairs, Sept. 12, 2008. The designations came on the heels of the decision of the Bolivian government of Evo Morales to expel the U.S. ambassador, allegedly for supporting armed movements against the Morales government. In
solidarity, Chavez then expelled the U.S. ambassador to Venezuela. In addition to the designations of the Venezuelan officials, the United States also expelled the Venezuelan and Bolivian ambassadors to Washington.
22 “Chávez Shores up Military Support,” Stratfor, November 12, 2010.
23 “Venezuela: Asume Nuevo Ministro De Defensa Acusado de Narco por EEUU,” Agence France Presse, January 17, 2012. 24 “Venezuela gives ‘hero’s welcome’ to freed Carvajal,” BBC News, July 28, 2014, accessed at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-28520775
As legendary Manhattan district attorney Robert M. Morgenthau warned as he left public service in 2009 after decades of public service, including pursuit of numerous (and ongoing) criminal investigations into the Chávez government’s role in TOC:
…[L]et there be no doubt that Hugo Chavez leads not only a corrupt government but one staffed by terrorist sympathizers. The government has strong ties to narcotrafficking and money laundering, and reportedly plays an active role in the transshipment of narcotics and the laundering of narcotics proceeds in exchange for payments to corrupt government officials.25
OFAC charges were buttressed by three other developments: A public presentation of Colombian intelligence on FARC camps in Venezuela and the meeting of high-level FARC commanders with senior Venezuelan officials, delivered at a session of the Organization of American States in July 2010;26 the public release of an analysis of all the FARC documents – – captured by the Colombian military from the March 1, 2008 killing of senior FARC commander Raúl Reyes — by a respected British security think that outlined some of the same ties;27 and the public statements of Walid Makled, a Venezuelan who was formally designated a drug kingpin by the U.S. government.
Arrested by Colombian police after he fled Venezuela, Makled was eventually extradited back to Venezuela. Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, dubbed Makeld, also known as “The Turk,” a ‘king among kingpins’. While in Colombian custody Makled gave multiple interviews and showed documents that he claimed showed he acquired control of one of Venezuela’s main ports, as well as an airline used for cocaine trafficking, but paying millions of dollars in bribes to senior Venezuelan official.
According the U.S. indictment against him, Makled exported at least 10 tons of cocaine a month to the United States by keeping more than 40 Venezuelan generals and senior government officials on his payroll. “All my business associates are generals. The highest,” Makled said. “I am telling you, we dispatched 300,000 kilos of coke. I couldn’t have done it without the top of the government.”28 What added credibility to Makled’s claims were the documents he presented showing what appear to be the signatures of several generals and senior Ministry of Interior officials accepting payment from Makled. “I have enough evidence to justify the invasion of Venezuela” as a criminal state, he said.29
25 Robert M. Morgenthau, “The Link Between Iran and Venezuela: A Crisis in the Making,” speech at the Brookings Institution, September 8, 2009.
26 Colombia, Venezuela: Another Round of Diplomatic Furor,” Strafor, July 29, 2010.
27 The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archives of ‘Raúl Reyes,’” An IISS Strategic Dossier, International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2011.
28 The Colombian decision to extradite Makled to Venezuela rather than the United States caused significant tension between the two countries and probably means that the bulk of the evidence he claims to possess will never see the light of day. Among the documents he presented in prison were checks of his cashed by senior generals and government officials and videos of what appear to be senior government officials in his home discussing cash transactions. For details of the case see: José de Córdoba and Darcy Crowe, “U.S. Losing Big Drug Catch,” The Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2011; “Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Indictment of one of World’s Most Significant Narcotics Kingpins,” United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, November 4, 2010.
29 “Makled: Tengo suficientes pruebas sobre corrupción y narcotráfico para que intervengan a Venezuela,” NTN24 TV (Colombia), April 11, 2011
There is growing evidence of the merging of the Bolivarian Revolution’s criminal-terrorist pipeline activities and those of the criminal-terrorist pipeline of radical Islamist groups (Hezbollah in particular) supported by the Iranian regime. The possibility opens a series of new security challenges for the United States and its allies in Latin America.
Among the cases that provide evidence of these ties are:
• In 2008, OFAC designated senior Venezuelan diplomats for facilitating the funding of Hezbollah.
One of those designated, Ghazi Nasr al Din, served as the charge d’affaires of the Venezuelan embassy in Damascus, and then served in the Venezuelan embassy in London. According to the OFAC statement in late January 2008, al Din facilitated the travel of two Hezbollah representatives of the Lebanese parliament to solicit donations and announce the opening of a Hezbollah-sponsored community center and office in Venezuela. The second individual, Fawzi Kan’an, is described as a Venezuela-based Hezbollah supporter and a “significant provider of financial support to Hizbollah.” He met with senior Hezbollah officials in Lebanon to discuss operational issues, including possible kidnappings and terrorist attacks.30
• In April 2009, police in the island country of Curacao arrested 17 people for alleged involvement in cocaine trafficking with some of the proceeds being funneled through Middle Eastern banks to Hezbollah.31
• A July 6, 2009 indictment of Jamal Yousef in the U.S. Southern District of New York alleges that the defendant, a former Syrian military officer arrested in Honduras, sought to sell weapons to the FARC — weapons he claimed came from Hezbollah and were to be provided by a relative in Mexico.32
Such a relationship between non-state and state actors provides numerous benefits to both. In Latin America, for example, the FARC gains access to Venezuelan territory without fear of reprisals; it gains access to Venezuelan identification documents; and, perhaps most importantly, access to routes for exporting cocaine to Europe and the United States — while using the same routes to import quantities of sophisticated weapons and communications equipment. In return, the Venezuelan government offers state protection, and reaps rewards in the form of financial benefits for individuals as well as institutions, derived from the cocaine trade.
Iran, whose banks, including its central bank, are largely barred from the Western financial systems, benefits from access to the international financial market through Venezuelan, Ecuadoran and Bolivian financial institutions, which act as proxies by moving Iranian
30 “Treasury Targets Hizbullah in Venezuela,” United States Department of Treasury Press Center, June 18, 2008, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1036.aspx
31 Orlando Cuales, “17 arrested in Curacao on suspicion of drug trafficking links with Hezbollah,” Associated Press, April 29, 2009
32 United States District Court, Southern District of New York, The United States of America v Jamal Yousef, Indictment, July 6, 2009.
money as if it originated in their own, unsanctioned financial systems.33 Venezuela also agreed to provide Iran with 20,000 barrels of gasoline per day, leading to U.S. sanctions against the state petroleum company.34
There is now a significant body of evidence showing the FARC’s operational alliance with Hezbollah and Hezbollah allies based in Venezuela under the protection of the Maduro government, to which relatively little attention has been paid.
A clear example of the breadth of the emerging alliances among criminal and terrorist groups was Operation Titan, executed by Colombian and U.S. officials beginning in 2008. Colombian and U.S. officials, after a 2-year investigation, dismantled a drug trafficking organization that stretched from Colombia to Panama, Mexico, West Africa, the United States, Europe and the Middle East. The operation then continued on for several more years as part of the Lebanese-Canadian National Bank case.
Colombian and U.S. officials say that one of the key money launderers in the structure, Chekry Harb, AKA “Taliban” acted as the central go-between among Latin American drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and Middle Eastern radical groups, primarily Hezbollah. Among the groups participating together in Harb’s operation in Colombia were members of the Northern Valley Cartel, right-wing paramilitary groups and the FARC.
While there has been little public acknowledgement of the Hezbollah ties to Latin American transnational organized crime (TOC) groups, recent indictments based on DEA cases point to the growing overlap of the groups. In December 2011, U.S. officials charged Ayman Joumaa, an accused Lebanese drug kingpin and Hezbollah financier, of smuggling tons of U.S.-bound cocaine and laundering hundreds of millions of dollars with the Zetas cartel of Mexico, while operating in Panama, Colombia, the DRC and elsewhere.
“Ayman Joumaa is one of top guys in the world at what he does: international drug trafficking and money laundering,” a U.S. anti-drug official said. “He has interaction with Hezbollah. There’s no indication that it’s ideological. It’s business.”35 Joumaa was tied to broader case of massive money laundering case that led to the collapse of the Lebanese Canadian Bank, one of the primary financial institutions used by Hezbollah to finance its worldwide activities.
Another little-studied aspect of Venezuela’s vast financial network is the use of PDVSA, the state oil company, to move hundreds of millions of dollars, with no legal financial backing, through its friends and allies in the Petrocaribe association, which was established by Chávez as a way to provide subsidized oil to poorer countries in the region. Under the construct, the receiving country is supposed to pay for 50 percent of the oil deliveries at market prices on delivery and pay for the other 50 percent over a 22-year period at a 2 percent interest rate.
33 For a look at how the Ecuadoran and Venezuelan banks function as proxies for Iran, particularly the Economic Development Bank of Iran, sanctioned for its illegal support of Iran’s nuclear program, and the Banco Internacional de Desarrollo, see: Farah and Simpson, op cit.
34 Office of the Spokesman, “Seven Companies Sanctioned Under Amended Iran Sanctions Act,” U.S. Department of State, May 24, 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/164132.htm
35 Sebastian Rotella, “Government says Hezbollah Profits From U.S. Cocaine Market via Link to Mexican Cartel,” ProPublica, December 11, 2011.
Yet the numbers don’t add up in Central America’s strongest Bolivarian members, Nicaragua and El Salvador. Hundreds of millions of dollars are received and spent with no auditing, no accountability and generally no trace.
The decision made by the leadership of the governing Sandinista party (FSLN )in Nicaragua and the governing Farabundo Martí (FMLN) in El Salvador, to work with the ALBA bloc of nations36 and their non-state allies such as the FARC in Colombia to move hundreds of millions of dollars in untraceable ways through inter-connected state oil companies, sets them apart from other Central American nations. While Venezuela’s oil exports plummet and the price of oil has collapsed, these two governments receive ever-larger amounts of cash that is untraceable.
In El Salvador, the governing FMLN controls ALBA Petróleos, which is 60 percent owned by PDVSA. President Salvador Sánchez Cerén is a member of the ALBA leadership and former guerrilla commander with close ties to the FARC. According to public statements of FMLN
36 The name is derived from former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s desire to recreate the original country created by South American liberator Simón Bolivar, which included Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Bolivia and Ecuador. Chávez dubbed his movement, which has relied heavily on the FARC both for financing and as a non-state armed actor, the Bolivarian Revolution. The radical populist bloc is formally known as ALBA, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America or Alianza Bolivariana Para los Pueblos de Nuestro America. It members include Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and El Salvador.
leaders such as José Luis Merino37, ALBA Petróleos began with $1 million from PDVSA in 2007 and by the end 2013 had revenues of $862 million, with no explanation for the massive growth.38 Merino, who is a senior ALBA Petróleos advisor, publicly stated that he knew that “many people are nervous because ALBA Petróleos was born six or seven years ago with $1 million and now has $400 million. Let me correct myself, $800 million, and we are trying to change the lives of Salvadorans.”39
One of the signature programs of ALBA in Nicaragua was to have been the construction of a large oil refinery. Named the “Supreme Dream of Bolivar” (Sueño Supremo de Bolívar), the refinery received $32 million in start up funding in 2008 and an additional $60 million over the following three years. In 2012 the program received an additional $141.2 million.
37 Merino, better known by his nom de guerre Ramiro Vásquez, was a Communist Party urban commando during El Salvador’s civil war and carried out a number of high profile kidnappings bother during and after the war. He was a well-known weapons provider to the FARC. His relationship with the FARC leadership, as well as the Chávez government, were well documented in captured FARC documents, where he is identified as “Ramiro the Salvadoran.” 38 These figures are taken from ALBA Petróleos official financial filings.
39 “José Luis Merino defiende a Alba Petróleos por ataques de ANEP,” Verdad Digital, October 31, 2013.
Yet all that is visible of the $237.2 million dollar investment is an empty field of compact earth with the flagstaffs bearing the flags of Nicaragua, Venezuela, Cuba and ALBA. Construction machinery has remained idle at the site for three years.40
These last few cases, though far afield from Venezuela, constitute a key part of Venezuela’s reach across the hemisphere and its ability to create corrupt structures, move well over $1 billion a year in unaccounted funds, and support criminal and terrorist organizations. These massive financial flows serve to corrupt the state, shield officials from accountability, create enormous “slush funds” for the governments to act without transparency, and are undermine the rule of law. They may also be of significant aid to drug trafficking and terrorist organization
As I noted earlier, Venezuela’s ongoing state-sponsored criminal activities and ties to terrorist organizations are not confined to Venezuela. Rather, Venezuela has made itself the hub of a multinational criminal enterprise that has tentacles across the hemisphere, and that receives the active support of Iran, Russia and other nations that have a declared hostile intent toward the United States. This is the direct threat posed by Venezuela and its ongoing crisis.
Thank you.
40 For an more comprehensive look at the refinery project and interesting graphics see: José Denis Curz, “El Supremo Sueño de Bolívar no avanza,” La Prensa (Nicaragua), March 25, 2013, accessed at: http://www.laprensa.com.ni/2013/03/25/poderes/139586-refineria-avance-invisible
